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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background
It was during the successive decolonization in the 1960s when the
right to development was first articulated by developing countries,
particularly those in Africa, as a necessary companion of their newly
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acquired political emancipation from their colonial masters.' As
originally envisioned, the right to development is not a human right
which is claimable by individuals against their own state, but rather a
people's right which is opposable erga omnes-that is, claimable vis-ivis the international community as a whole. After the wave of
decolonization in the 1960s, the right to development took the form of a
demand by developing countries against developed ones to bring to an
end the perpetuation of, whether perceived or real, colonialist policies
of economic domination and exploitation. 2 The right became associated
with two specific demands, namely, the establishment of a "new
international economic order" which would be more conducive to the
economic progress of developing countries, and the adherence to the
notion that peoples must have full control over their natural wealth and
resources. 3 Because of their economic dependency on developed
countries, the newly independent developing countries were pushing for
"a restructuring of the global economic system through a new
international economic order." Thus, in the 1960s, while the Western
world was trumpeting individual human rights guaranteed in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two international
human rights covenants, a significant number of developing countries
were testing the waters, so to speak, by crafting a collective right to
development to bolster their demand for fundamental changes in their
economic relationship with the developed world. During a 1967
meeting of the Group of 77 developing countries, the foreign minister of
Senegal emphatically declared that
Our task is to denounce the old colonial compact and to replace it
with a new right. In the same way that developed countries
proclaimed individual rights to education, health and work, we
must claim here, loud and clear, that the nations of the Third
World have the right to development.

1. Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Right to Development, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 1177 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991). This is not to say,

however, that the right to development is operative only in the immediate aftermath of
decolonization. The right remains a continuing collective entitlement of peoples.
2. David Beetham, The Right to Development and Its CorrespondingObligations, in
DEVELOPMENT AS A HUMAN RIGHT 79, 79-80 (Bard A. Andreassen & Stephen Marks eds.,
2006).
3. Id. at 79.
4. Khurshid Iqbal, The Declaration on the Right to Development and Implementation, 1
Pol. Persp. Graduate J. 1, 4 (2007).
5. Laurent Meillan, The Right to Development and the United Nations, 34 DROrr EN
QUART MONDE 14 (2003).
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The concept of the right to development was first recognized by the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1977.6 The then Commission
acknowledged the right to development as a "human right" and
recommended to the Economic and Social Council that it should invite
the Secretary-General to undertake a study on the subject. With the
creation of a Working Group of Government Experts on the Right to
Development in 1981, the debate on the right was formally elevated in
the U.N. agenda.7 The Declaration on the Right to Development was
subsequently adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1986 in an
almost unanimous vote, with only the United States casting a negative
vote.8 The World Conference on Human Rights held in 1993 reaffirmed
the right to development, as formulated in the 1986 Declaration, as a
universal and inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental
human rights.9 During this conference, a consensus was reached among
developed and developing countries that the right to development is
indeed a human right. 0 In 2000, world leaders attending the U.N.
Millennium Summit reached an agreement on a set of goals and targets
for fighting extreme poverty, environmental degradation, disease,
hunger and discrimination against women, which later became the
Millennium Development Goals. The Summit Declaration included a
pledge "to making the right to development a reality for everyone and to
freeing the entire human race from want.""
B. CriticismsAgainst the Right to Development
However, the right to development is not without criticisms both
with respect to its basis in international law and its susceptibility to

6. Development-Right to Development, Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/development/right/index.htm.
7. Id.
8. The Declarationon the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st
Sess., 97th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/RES/41/128 (1986) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 41/128]. Eight
other countries abstained.
9. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the U.N. World
Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declarationand Programme ofAction,
Part I, § 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24.
10. lqbal, supra note 4, at 6.
11. The Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, $ 11, U.N. GAOR, 55th sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000). While these high-level conferences have elevated the status
of the right to development in the political sphere, they are not "sources" of international law
stricto jure. But they may be taken as evidence of opiniojuris which, if coupled with a general
practice among a large number of states, may be creative of customary international law.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

3

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 6

302

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22

implementation in actual controversies.12 Some burning questions
remain to be answered and some apparent answers need to be
questioned: Does the right to development have a firm basis in
international law to begin with? Has it crystallized into something more
than a "soft law"' 3 to be of any practical use to international lawyers?
What is the precise content of the right to development and against
whom can it be claimed?
Some skeptics dismiss the validity of the right to development
because it is allegedly a "right to everything," the "sum of all human
rights" or an amalgamation of all the existing individual human rights.14
They argue that the right does not add anything new and substantial to
human rights law because all it does is to combine existing individual
human rights. This misconception about the right to development is
fuelled by at least two official U.N. reports that endorse the view that
the right to development is less of a separate right than a synthesis of all
other human rights.' 5 The purported dual nature of the right also fans
the fire of confusion surrounding it.
Another criticism commonly raised against the right to development
is its alleged "non-justiciable" nature. Indeed, the same criticism is
also levelled against economic, social, and cultural rights in general.
Hans Kelsen explains why this criticism is valid by arguing that "the
essential element [of a right] is the legal power bestowed upon the
[individual] by the legal order to bring about, by a law suit, the
execution of a sanction as a reaction against the non-fulfilment of the
12. See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudenceand Politics of
the Right to Development, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 473 (1985); Philip Alston, Making Space for
New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development, 1 HARv. HUM. RTs. Y.B. 3, 20
(1988).
13. The term "soft law" is used to refer to certain norms whose underlying basis lies
outside the traditional sources of international as stipulated in Article 38(1) of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute and are, therefore, non-binding. Other terms are used to refer to
soft law such prd-droit,para-droitandpiri-droit,all of which connote the idea of a moral norm
that may or may not evolve into a legal rule. See Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in
InternationalLaw, 77 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 413, 421 (1983); see also Christine M. Chinkin, The
Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT'L COMP. L.Q.
850(1989).
14. YASHI GAI, WHOSE HUMAN RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT'? 13-15 (Commonwealth
Secretariat 1989).
15. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General: The International
Dimensions of the Right to Development as a Human Right in Relation with Other Human
Rights Based on InternationalCooperation,Including the Right to Peace, Taking into Account
the Requirements of the New InternationalEconomic Order and FundamentalHuman Needs,
U.N. Doc, E/CN.4.1334 (Jan. 2, 1979); see also Report of the Working Group of Governmental
Experts on the Right to Development, Commission on Human Rights, 38th Sess., Prov. Agenda
Item 8, at 3, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1489, (Feb. 11, 1982).
16. See, e.g., Donnelly, supranote 12.
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obligation."' 7 Jack Donnelly is likewise of the view that human rights
must entail clear legal obligations on the part of "duty-holders" if they
are to qualify as rights in the real sense.
Finally, the right to development has been criticized as a right of
states to pursue a narrow model of economic development over the
human rights of the people of the state invoking the right.' 9 The
economic development of Singapore and the relative curtailment of
basic freedoms in that country is a usual example given to bolster this
criticism. 20 With this right, the state is allegedly prone to sacrificing the
human rights of its people in order to pursue its own version of
economic development. In particular, the criticism is based on the fear
that "[tihe right to development [will allow] states where necessary to
put the interests of investors over the interests of other human beings."21
C. Legal Positivism as a Methodology
Using legal positivism as a distinct methodology for finding the
"law," this Article will demonstrate that the right to development is a
legally binding rule of international law. In the process, this Article
aims to refute the criticisms levelled against the right to development. In
order to do this, it is essential to establish the right's mandatory nature
and debunk notions that the right belongs to the realm of "soft law." 22
The term "soft law" is used to refer to certain norms whose underlying
basis lies outside the category of "sources" of international as stipulated
in Article 38(1) of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute and
are, therefore, non-binding. 23 Other terms are used to refer to "soft law"
17.

Alston, supra note 12, at 34 (citing HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAw 125-26 (M.

Knight trans. 1967)).
18. See, e.g., Donnelly, supra note 12, at 473.
19. Anne Orford, Globalization and the Right to Development, in PEOPLE'S RIGHTs 127,
135 (Philip Alston ed., 2001).
20. Simon S.C. Tay, Human Rights, Culture, and the Singapore Example, 41 McGILL
L.J. 743, 745 (1996).
21. Orford, supra note 19.
22. See generally Gunther F. Handl, A HardLook at Soft Law: Remarks, 82 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 371 (1988).
23. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

5

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 6

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

304

[Vol. 22

such as prd-droit,para-droit,and piri-droit, all of which connote the
idea of a moral norm that may or may not evolve into a legal rule. 24
The idea that international law is a product of state consent is
encapsulated in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute which "is widely
recognised as the most authoritative and complete statement as to the
sources of international law." 25 Therefore, any effort in finding the
"source" from which the right to development emanates must be
consistent with Article 38(1). The task at hand is in keeping with Ian
Brownlie's advice to international lawyers "not to stray from the
confines of positive international law." 26 This positivism demands the
"envisaging [of] international law as positive law, i.e., as lex lata."27
According to Prosper Weil, this approach requires lawyers to maintain
the "distinction between lex lata and lex ferenda . .. with no abatement
of either its scope or its rigor." 28 This Article will demonstrate that the
concept of the right to development regroups and consolidates into a
single rubric certain fundamental norms which are already in existence
under international law. This being the case, the right draws its legal
strength from the simultaneous and interlocking operation of these
fundamental norms in the international system.
This Article will argue that separate legal norms which are already in
existence in international law actually coalesce and reinforce one
another to form a "super-norm" which is the right to development. It
will propose a new view on how this clustering of individual norms
takes place in order to form an encompassing legal rule. While this
"clustering process" is something novel, it will be shown that it does not
digress from the accepted sources of international law and hence from
legal positivism.
In discussing the individual norms that comprise the right to
development, this Article traces their sources in international treaty,
international custom, or the general principles of international law.
Whenever there is a need to shed light on the precise contents of these
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 589 Stat. 1031, 3 Bevans
1179.
24. Oscar Schachter, The Evolving InternationalLaw of Development, 15 COLUM. J. OF
TRANSNAT'L L. 1,4 (1976).
25.

26.
PEOPLEs
27.
413, 421
28.

MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (6th ed. 2008).

Ian Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern InternationalLaw, in THE RIGHTS OF
1, 14-15 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
(1983).
Id
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norms (i.e. entitlements of the obligee and duties of the obligor), this
thesis relies primarily on the resolutions adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly as interpretative aids. While these resolutions are not per se
"sources" of international law, their usefulness lies in being
authoritative elaborations or elucidations of existing legal norms as
understood by states.2 9 Resorting to these resolutions in order to arrive
at clearer and more precise legal norms, therefore, does not digress from
the theory and methodology of legal positivism. It bears stressing that
General Assembly resolutions are also consented to by at least the
majority of U.N. Member States, thus creating a legitimate expectation
that they will act consistently with what the resolutions state.30 After all,
the presumption is that states mean what they say and say what they
mean in international fora. Aside from being authoritative aids for treaty
interpretation, General Assembly resolutions may be taken as evidence
of the opinio juris of states-an indispensable component of customary
international law.
II. THE PURPORTED 'DUAL NATURE' OF THE RIGHT TO
DEVELOPMENT AND ITS DILUTING EFFECT ON NORM-CREATION

While the adoption of the Declaration on the Right to Development
in 1986 has brought to the fore important issues concerning the right's
normative content, 3 1 it must be pointed out that the legal basis of the
right is not derived from the declaration itself which, true to its name, is
merely declaratory of its existence. 32 What is noteworthy in the
Declaration is its explicit departure from the original conception of the
right to development in the 1960s when it was understood as a
collective entitlement of peoples. The Declaration defines the right to
development as
an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human
person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, and
contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural, and political

29.

LoRI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 145-46 (4th

ed. 2004).
30. Id.
31. Stephen Marks, The Obstacles to the Right to Development 6-7 (Harvard Univ.
Fracois-Xavier Bagnoud Ctr. for Health & Human Rights, Working Paper No. 17, 2003).
32. However, some commentators argue that resolutions adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly may have a legal force depending on a set of factors. See, e.g., Bedjaoui, supra note
1, at 1194.
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development in which all human rights and fundamental
freedoms can be fully realized.3 3
From this formulation, it is clear that the right to development as
envisaged by the drafters of the Declaration is both an individual human
right to be enjoyed by every person and a collective right guaranteed to
entire peoples. However, adding an "individual" dimension to the right
to development does not give it added clarity and focus, instead such
addition only adversely affects its normative strength. Isabella Bunn
argues that the dual nature of the right creates "difficulties in identifying
the beneficiaries and duty-holders under the right." 34 In addition,
considering it as a right of every individual within a state makes it
vulnerable to a serious definitional challenge. A proponent of this
dualist perspective, Amartya Sen defined the right to development as "a
conglomeration of a collection of claims, varying from basic education,
health care and nutrition to political liberties, religious freedoms and
civil rights for all."35 The over expansiveness of his definition is readily
apparent because it describes the right to development, not only as a
collection of virtually all human rights claims, but it is also a
conglomeration of such collections. Sen also offered a definition of the
concept of development as the "expansion of substantive freedom or
capabilities of persons to lead the kind of lives they value or have
reason to value." 36 What is meant by "development" of an individual? If
it is the amalgamation or "sum" of all human rights guaranteed in the
covenants, 3 7 why collapse them into one mega-right and on what basis?
While this definition is a good exercise in philosophical abstraction, it
falls short as a source of concrete entitlements on the part of the "rightsholder" and identifiable obligations on the part of the "duty-bearers." 38
Arjun Sengupta formulated yet another expansive definition of the right
to development thus:
33.
34.

See G.A. Res. 41/128, supra note 8 (emphasis added).
Isabella Bunn, The Right to Development: Implicationsfor International Economic

Law, 15 AM. UNIv. INT'L L.R. 1425, 1435 (2000).
35. Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Development, in DEVELOPMENT AS A HUMAN RIGHT:
LEGAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS 1, 5 (Bard Andreassen & Stephen Marks eds.,

2003).
36.

AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 16, 35 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1999).

37. The right to development is sometimes described as "distilled" from existing
individual and collective rights or the "sum" of them all. Roland Y. Rich, The Right to
Development as an Emerging Human Right, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 287, 323-24 (1983) [Rich, An
EmergingHuman Right].
38. In human rights parlance, a particular right is said to confer entitlements in favor of
an individual or a people who are referred to as the "rights-holder." Such entitlements may be
demanded primarily from states or the international community who are referred to as the "dutybearers." On the dichotomy between rights and duties, see HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 180-81 (2000).
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The right to development refers to a process of development
which leads to the realization of each human right and of all of
them together and which has to be carried out in a manner known
as rights-based, in accordance with the international human rights
standards, as a participatory, non-discriminatory, accountable and
transparent process with equity in decision-making and sharing of
the fruits of the process. 39
The definition is littered with tautologies: a rights-based process of
development is precisely one that produces human rights realization;
and human rights realization is necessarily based on international
human rights standards. But being tautological is not its most serious
flaw. If one looks closer, it is difficult to find any value an individual or
a people holds dear and aspires that is not included in this definition. In
other words, every possible individual or societal "good" is
encompassed by it. This, in fact, led many critics and sceptics alike to
condemn the right to development as a "right to everything.'4o
It is in this context that David Beetham laments how the existing
literature on the right to development has unnecessarily expanded the
right well beyond its core meaning, and thus sacrificing its "clarity of
focus" and diluting its normative force.41 He pushes for the narrowing
down of the right to development's definitional scope to "a nation's or
people's right to economic development.A 2 He observes that
The more the right to development is expanded to include all
possible aspects of development, the more difficult it becomes to
specify what would count as a violation or infringement of the
right, since almost anything might count as such, and the
responsibility for not fulfilling it becomes correspondingly
diffuse and unidentifiable..

.

. In sum, a wide definition of the

right to development provides a convenient excuse for the
evasion of responsibility. 43
It is not the conception of the right to development as an individual
human right but rather its collective nature and inter-state dimension
that truly makes it a legal tool to address the real problems faced by
debtor countries.
39. Arjun K. Sengupta, On the Theory and Practice on the Right to Development, 24
HuM. RTs. Q. 846 (2002).
40. Felix Kirchmeier, The Right to Development-Where Do We Stand?, 4 Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung, Occasional Papers, No. 23, July 2006.
41. Beetham, supra note 2, at 81.
42. Id. at 95.
43. Id. at 83-84.
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III. FROM NORM TO SUPERNORM:
THE BASIS OF THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Right to Development is a People's Right
In order that the right to development may acquire a more
compelling relevance in theory and practice, it is essential to reenvisage it as a "collective right"-that is, a people's right to be
invoked on their behalf by their own state vis-A-vis the international
community." Mohammed Bedjaoui, a former judge of the ICJ and one
of the exponents of the right to development, opines that "placing the
right to development among human rights whose enjoyment we are all
too prone to regard as being restricted to the human being as an
individual" only weakens the right and "dangerously obscure[s] the real
international aspects of the basic problem."4 He concludes that the right
to development is "much more a right of the State or of the people, than
a right of the individual."4 6 Expanding the right to development by
making it both an individual and a collective right only muddles its
conceptual clarity and dilutes its strength as a rule of international law.
Because the intended beneficiary of the right to development is "the
people"-which is here taken to mean as the community of persons
with a political organization comprising a state, certain questions
relating to representation or agency comes to mind. Who represents the
people in the international system? Who can legitimately invoke the
right to development on their behalf? The prevailing view is that the
people can act in the international system only through their state,
except in certain situations. Ian Brownlie observes that, in the
international system, "the primary obligors and obligees of the right to
development-that is, the subjects in the strict sense of those who can
either claim entitlements or are potential respondents to such claimsare States."4 8 Similarly Roland Rich argues that there is "no effective
means of implementing the right to development other than through

44. Kirchmeier, supra note 40, at 10.
45. Bedjaoui, supranote 1, at 1180.
46. Id. at 1184.
47. Some notable examples are people who are subjugated by a colonialist state; who are
under an occupying or invading power; and who are subjugated by a racist state. Under these
situations, these peoples in the exercise of their right to self-determination may act in the
international system on their own behalf (usually through national liberation movements)
without the intercession of the colonialist, occupying or racist state. See, e.g., ANTONIO
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW INA DIVIDED WORLD 90-95 (1986).
48.

IAN BROWNLIE, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, STUDY PREPARED FOR THE

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT (1989).
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States and their governments."4 9 Therefore, owing to its unique nature
and historical origin, the right to development is only applicable in the
external relations between the developed and developing states
(horizontal dimension), and not in the relations between a state and its
own people or an individual (vertical dimension).
Sticking to the original formulation of the right to development as a
collective right of a people preserves its conceptual clarity and focus as
a legally binding rule. The original formulation makes possible the
identification of precise entitlements and obligations on the part of the
"rights-holder" and the "duty-bearers," respectively. Georges Abi-Saab
argues that, in order for the right to development to qualify as a legally
binding rule, the "active and passive subjects of the right and its
content" must be clearly identified.50 This identification of the "rightsholder" and "duty-bearer," and what is legally due to and from each, is
essential in locating the metes and bounds of a right (i.e., what the right
is). Christine Chinkin essentially agrees with this analysis by arguing
that a rule is, or becomes, a legal rule if and when "certain legal
consequences follow from its performance and its breach" and adds that
"it must be possible both to determine breach and the legal outcome of
any claim of breach." 5 '
B. The Two Components of the Right to Development Make It a
Legal Right
There is an urgent need to resist, both at an intellectual and practical
level, the temptation to regard the right to development as the
amalgamation of all human rights because it effectively dilutes the
right's normative character and renders it ineffectual. This Article
proposes to return to the core of the right to development-to narrow it
down to its essential components-if it is to remain a functional
concept. These components, designed to benefit developing states, are:
(1) Right to an independent process of economic development;
and
(2) Right to international conditions favorable to the realization
of ESC rights within states.

49. Roland Rich, The Right to Development: A Right of Peoples [hereinafter Rich, A
Right ofPeoples], in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supranote 26, at 39, 53.
50. Georges Abi-saab, The Legal Formulation of a Right to Development, in THE RIGHT
To DEVELOPMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 163 (Hague Academy of International Law,
1980).
51. Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in
InternationalLaw, 38 INT'L COMP L.Q. 850, 859 (1989).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

11

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 6

310

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

(Vol. 22

Both components stand on a solid legal footing because each one is
founded on legally binding norms already in existence in international
law. Mindful of these components, this article offers the following
definition of the right to development:
The right to development is a right of the people of a state to
pursue an independent process of economic development that
takes place within the context of international conditions that are
favorable to the progressive realization of economic, social and
cultural rights within their state.
This definition keeps intact the "collective" nature of the right that
makes it opposable against the international community and removes
any embellishment that it is also an individual human right claimable by
every person against his or her state. Explicit in this definition are the
following entitlements in favor of the "people" of every state: first, they
have a right to implement a process of economic development
independently and free from interference from other states or
international organizations (right to an independent development
process); and second, they have a right to international conditions that
are favorable, rather than harmful or damaging, to the progressive
realization of economic, social, and cultural rights in their country (right
to favorable global conditions for domestic realization of rights).
Correspondingly, the following obligations on the part of other states
or international organizations as "duty-bearers" can be deduced from
this definition: first, they have an obligation to respect every people's
freedom to pursue their own development process; and second, they
have an obligation to modify, alter or even discontinue certain activities,
such as international economic or financial arrangements, that result in
"unfavorable conditions" that damage or harm the progressive
realization of human rights in the territory of other states. Milan Bulajic
was referring to this second component when he argued that "the
international community must assume the correlative obligation of
establishing the conditions that permit the attainment of national
goals."5 2 Thus, from the perspective of the "rights-holder," the right to
development has two interrelated components as depicted by Figure I
below:

52. MILAN BuLAnc, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW 16 (2d ed. 1993)
(emphasis added).
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Figure 1: Components and supporting norms of the right to
development

Right to Developient
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It is submitted here that both components of the right to development
spring from certain fundamental norms whose underlying bases are
firmly established in the recognized "sources" of international law. This
gives the right to development its composite nature. This Article will
discuss these norms ad seriatim and will demonstrate how they are
intimately sewn up into a consolidated concept-a supernorm-ofthe
right to development. Prosper Weil describes the norms in international
law as having relative normativity whereby the legal force of each norm
is a matter of "more or less" on a gradated scale. He theorizes of the
possibility of "an ordinary norm becom[ing] a supernorm" or "it even
appears that any subnorm of general international law might be coaxed
upward, in a stealthy rise from nonlaw to superlaw."5 4 The force that
lifts an ordinary norm in its rise to become a supernorm remains to be
53.

See Weil, supra note 27, at 421.

54.

Id at 427.
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the consent of states to be bound by rules, as encapsulated in Article
38(1) of the ICJ Statute.
The emergence of the right to development is occasioned by a
similar norm-creating process, albeit one that is incremental in nature.
The process can be conceived of as a gradual formation of, for lack of a
better term, a cluster of norms whose cohesion relies on the normative
strength of each norm comprising the whole. It has become a kneejerk
reaction among lawyers, especially positivists, to gauge a single norm's
relative normativity on the basis of the widely accepted sources of
international law, and easily lose sight of the fact that any norm does
not operate in a legal vacuum. It always co-exists with other norms that
operate simultaneously in a particular legal regime (e.g., law of armed
conflict or law of the sea) and in the broader international legal system.
What drives the behavior of states is the combination of the norms that
they adhere to. What emerges from this simultaneous observance of
norms is a cluster of norms interlocking and overlapping at each other,
and mutually reinforcing each other's legal strength. Lawyers are so
used to imagining the formation of law in the international system as an
upward linear progression from non-law (moral norms), to soft law, to
hard law, and finally to jus cogens at the top. This Article proposes to
add something novel-but not revolutionary as to digress from the
accepted "sources" of international law-to this view: norms as they
move upwards along the graduated scale tend to cluster together as they
reach the top-overlapping and interrelating with each other with the
aim of securing and even reinforcing their coveted place and status as a
legal rule.
An example is in order to illustrate this clusteringprocess. Take, for
instance, the "principle of distinction" which is well-settled in
international humanitarian law.5 5 A myriad of norms actually comprise
this principle that include, inter alia,differentiating between combatants
and non-combatants; differentiating between civilian objects and
legitimate military targets; protection of combatants hors de combat;
and protection of religious and cultural places. 6 These norms, all
55. See, e.g., Marco Sassoli, Targeting: The Scope and Utility of the Concept of 'Military
Objectives'for the Protection of Civilians in Contemporary Armed Conflicts, in NEW WARS,
NEW LAWS?: APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 181, 182-84 (David
Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005).

56. The rationale of the principle of distinction is to attack only those that are legitimate
military targets and to prohibit indiscriminate attacks against persons or properties. Article 48 of
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions provides: "In order to ensure respect for and
protection of the civilian population and civilian object, the Parties to the conflict shall at all
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives." See Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, openedfor signatureDec. 12,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 48, enteredinto force Dec. 7, 1979.
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operating simultaneously and reinforcing one another, contribute to the
legal validity and strength of the principle of distinction. Another
example is the fairly advanced principle of the "common heritage of
mankind" which first appeared in the treaty governing Antarctica and
later in the law governing outer space and the seabed. 5 Jennifer Frakes
has identified five norms actually comprising the common heritage of
mankind principle.5 8 First, there can be no private or public
appropriation of the common heritage spaces (non-appropriation
norm). 5 9 Second, resources contained in common heritage areas should
60
be managed on behalf of all nations (norm of shared management).
Third, all nations must actively share with each other the benefits
acquired from exploitation of the resources from the common heritage
areas. Fourth, these areas should not be used for military purposes.
Fifth, these areas should be "preserved for the benefit of future
generations." 63 The validity and strength of the common heritage of
mankind principle depend on the commitment of states to comply with
(state practice) and adhere to (opinio juris) the individual norms that
comprise it.
In the case of the right to development, the clustering of norms first
appeared in the particular regime of international economic law after the
wave of decolonization in the 1960s, and it later acquired more urgency
(as well as legitimacy) courtesy of the regime of human rights law. This
Article demonstrates that the right to development is borne out of this
incremental process happening gradually in two separate but interfacing
international law regimes. The right to development regroups and
consolidates into a single rubric certain fundamental norms which are
already existing for quite some time under the regimes of international
economic law and human rights law. This being the case, the right to
development-similar to the principles of distinction and common
heritage of mankind-draws its legal strength from the simultaneous
and interlocking operation of these fundamental norms in the
international system. These norms are the following:

57. Antarctic Treaty pmbl. art. VI., Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 72; Treaty
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205; U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) art. 136, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
58. Jennifer Frakes, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principleand the Deep Seabed,
Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach a Compromise?,
21 Wis. INT'L L.J. 409,411 (2003).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 412.
61. Id. at 413.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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(1) The principle of economic self-determination of peoples;
(2) The people's permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth
and resources;
(3) The duty of international cooperation among states;
(4) The duty of preferential treatment of developing states; and
(5) The duty of preventing damage or harm against the rights of
another state.
It is submitted that the first two norms-mutually reinforcing one
another-are the underlying rationale of the first component of the right
to development (i.e., the right to an independent development process);
while the last three norms, also interrelated and overlapping, are the
pillars of the second component (i.e., the right to favorable international
conditions for domestic realization of economic, social, and cultural
rights). It bears stressing that the right to development draws its legal
strength from all its constituent norms. It is only when these norms are
taken together that a more complete structure of the right to
development-and one that stands on a solid legal footing-begins to
take shape.
1. Right to an Independent Development Process
a. The Principle of Economic Self-determination of Peoples
Article 1(2) of the U.N. Charter provides that one of the
organization's purposes is the development of friendly relations among
states based upon the "principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples."64 That the right to self-determination is recognized in the
U.N. Charter itself, which some reiard as the constitutional document
of present-day international system, shows the right's high priority in
the hierarchy of international law norms. The ICJ in fact characterized
the right to self-determination as a "norm of the nature of jus cogens6
derogation from which is not permissible under any circumstances." 6
The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations may be regarded as an "authoritative interpretation"
of U.N. Charter provisions dealing with the right to selfdetermination.6 7 The Declaration states, among others, that "all peoples
64.

U.N. Charter art. 1,para. 2.

65.

See, e.g., BRUNO SmiA, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 16

(Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002).
66. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Counsel Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, 1981, I.C.J. 16 (June 21) (Ammoun, concurring).
67. SHAw, supra note 25, at 253.
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have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their
political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development" 68 and that all states have the duty to respect this right.
Aside from the U.N. Charter, other major treaties recognize the
existence of the right to self-determination. Common Article 1(1) of the
ICESCR and the ICCPR provides that
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.6 9
It is clear therefore that the right to self-determination has two
incidences: a people can choose whatever type of government they wish
and they can freely undertake their economic, social, and cultural
development. It is the right's "economic aspect" that needs to be
emphasized here-that which guarantees the freedom of peoples in their
pursuit of "economic development." The self-determination of peoples
necessarily entails an independent control of a country's economy in
general and an effective involvement in economic planning in
particular.
Without these, self-determination is never complete. This is only
logical because, for a people who have liberated themselves from a
colonial, occupying or racist state and have declared political
independence, their newly found freedom will be meaningless if this is
not coupled with the freedom to choose an economic system that is
viable for the country and the freedom to determine its own model of
economic development. This is not to say, however, that the right to
self-determination is applicable only for peoples escaping the clutches
of colonialism, occupation, or racism as argued by some
commentators. 70
The right's inclusion in the ICESCR and .ICCPR ensures its
continuing applicability well beyond the context of colonialism,
occupation, or racism. James Crawford observes that the right's
inclusion in the two covenants has a "tone of universality."n Consistent
68. Declarationon Principlesof InternationalLaw ConcerningFriendly Relations, G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), U.N. Doc. A/8018 at 123 (Oct. 24,
1970).
69. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Part I, art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www2.ohchr/org/english/law/ccpr.htm.
70. Antonio Cassese, for example, argues that present-day international law limits the
application of the right to self-determination to three situations: "(1) an anti-colonial postulate;
(2) a criterion for condemning those forms of oppression of a people involving the 'occupation'
of territory; (3) an anti-racist postulate." CASSESE, supra note 47, at 135.
71. James Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: Peoples or Governments?, in THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES, supranote 26, at 55, 58.
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with this view, the International Law Commission expressed its opinion
that the right to self-determination is of "universal" application. 72
In the two articles of the U.N. Charter where the right is mentioned
(i.e., Articles 1(2) and 55), the contexts are different from issues of
colonialism, occupation, or racism which suggests the right's
applicability in other situations.7 3 Thus, the people of a state that is not
colonialist, occupying nor racist have inter alia the inherent freedom to
choose their economic system and to determine their own model of
economic development. Self-determination, including its economic
dimension, is a continuing right of the people that does not end with
political emancipation.
Even after political emancipation, the right continuously guarantees
that the people can genuinely manage or lead their economic future.
Mohammed Bedjaoui seems to equate the concept of economic selfdetermination with the "right to development" when he stated that
The "right to development" flows from this right to selfdetermination and has the same nature. There is little sense in
recognizing self-determination as a superior and inviolable
principle if one does not recognize at the same time a "right to
development" for the peoples that have achieved selfdetermination. This right to development can only be an
"inherent" and "built-in" right forming an inseparable part of the
right to self-determination.74
One obvious violation of the right to economic self-determination is
"economic coercion." S. Azadon Tiewul describes "economic coercion"
as "an attempt to constrain state conduct through the use of withholding
of economic resources."7 Clearly, economic coercion can take on many
forms and degrees ranging, for example, from discreet impositions in an
onerous trade agreement to outright trade embargoes. The term
"economic coercion" does not include economic sanctions that may be
lawfully imposed by the Security Council under the U.N. Charter.7 6
72. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Fortieth Session,
G.A. Res. 42/156 at 64, U.N. Doc. A/43/10 (1988), reprintedin [1990] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1988/Add.1.
73. Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: Peoples or Governments?, in THE RIGHTS OF THE
PEOPLES, supra note 26, at 55, 58.

74. Bedjaoui, supranote 1, at 1184 (emphasis in original).
75. S. Azadon Tiewul, The UN Charter of Economic Right and Duties of States, 10 J.
INT'L L. & EcON. 645, 670 (1975).
76. The Security Council may act whenever it is satisfied of "the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." U.N. Charter art. 39. In any of these
three situations, the Security Council may call on Member States of the United Nations to apply
economic, political, diplomatic or other sanctions against the culprit state or, if these measures
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What the term encompasses are interventions in the internal and
external affairs of another state using economic measures. This makes
"economic coercion" violative of another fundamental principle of
international law-the principle of non-intervention.7 7 Citing several
declarations of the U.N. General Assembly, Oscar Schachter argues that
"economic coercion directed against the sovereign rights and
independence of any state has been declared to be in violation of
international law." 78 The 1974 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources specifically deplores "acts of states which use
force, armed aggression, economic coercion or any other illegal or
improper means in resolving disputes." 79 It also provides that states
have a "duty to refrain in their international relations from military,
political, economic or any other form of coercion aimed against the
territorial integrity of any State."80
b. The People's Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources
The "sovereign equality of states" is a cornerstone of present-day
international law. 8 In fact, it is securely enshrined in the U.N. Charter
which provides that the "Organisation is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members." 82 Ian Brownlie explains the
centrality of "state sovereignty" in present day international law, thus
sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic
constitutional doctrine of the law of nations, which governs a
community consisting primarily of states having a uniform legal
personality. If international law exists, then the dynamics of state
sovereignty can be expressed in terms of law, and, as states are
equal and have legal personality, sovereignty is in a major aspect
a relation to other states (and to organizations of states) defined
by law. 83
There is a specific aspect of state sovereignty that is inextricably
connected to the right to development-this is the principle of
are unsuccessful, to take such military action "as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security." Id. arts. 41-42.
77. Detlev C. Dicke, The Concept of Coercion: A Wrong in Itself in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 187, 190 (Paul de Waart et al. eds., 1988).

78. Schachter, supra note 24, at 14 n.30.
79. 1974 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171,
4, 28 U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, Doc A/9030 (1974).
80. Id. 6.
81.

MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 157 (3d ed. 1999).

82.

U.N. Charter art. 2, para 1.
LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (4th ed. 1990).

83.
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"permanent sovereignty over natural resources."8 4 The principle of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources has gained wide
acceptance among states.85 It is recognized in both the ICESCR and the
ICCPR in their common Article 1(2) and another common article
(Articles 25 and 47, respectively) which state that
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their
natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations
arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon
the principle of mutual benefit and international law. In no case
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing
the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and
freely their natural wealth and resources.
The principle of "permanent sovereignty over natural resources" is
also recognized in other multilateral treaties like the African Charter on
Human and People's Rights (1981), the two Vienna Conventions on
Succession of States (1978 and 1983) and the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea (1982).87 The principle of "permanent sovereignty over
natural resources" was further elaborated by the U.N. General Assembly
through the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.88 Whereas
the principle originally covered physical resources such as minerals,
flora and fauna, the General Assembly explained its coverage to include
all of a country's "wealth, natural resources and economic activities."89

The inclusion of economic activities in the principle assures the
people's sovereign right to regulate or oversee all economic activities
within their country for their own ends. Nico J. Schrijver summarizes
the most important implications of the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, particularly for the peoples of
84. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 1 15, 17
U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No.17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
85. Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: Peoples or Governments?, in THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES, supra note 26, at 63.

86. International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, arts. 1(2) and 25,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp.
No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316(1966), entered intoforce Jan. 3, 1976.
87. Nico J. Schrijver, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources Versus the
Common Heritage of Mankind: Complementary or Contradictory Principles of International
Economic Law? [hereinafter Schrijver, Permanent Sovereignty], in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT, supranote 77, at 87, 91.

88. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281(xxix), art. 2,
U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (Dec. 12, 1974) (emphasis added).
89. Id.
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developing countries.90 Aside from the principal right to possess, use,
and dispose of their natural resources, this principle supports inter alia
the right of a people "to withdraw from unequal investment treaties and
to renounce contractual relations when one party unjustly enriches itself
thereby" and the right "to revise the terms of an arrangement in the
exercise of [their] legislative competence." 9 ' Subrata Roy Chowdhury
extols the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as
"a seminal source for rules from which a State can derive a wide range
of powers to exercise control over production and distribution
arrangements in aid of its right to development." 92
Moreover, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources further implies that, if foreign control or influence inhibits a
people from possessing, using or disposing of their natural wealth and
resources as they deem proper, then their right to development is
violated. Another clear implication is that a people cannot involuntarily
renounce their right to possess, use and dispose of their natural
resources without compromising their right to development. Of course,
a people can voluntarily allow multinational corporations or other states
to economically exploit their natural resources (for example, in an oil
exploration agreement) but that action is not violative of their
permanent sovereignty over natural resources; it is in fact consistent
with it because they had the freedom to choose to allow or prevent
foreign economic exploitation.93
2. Right to International Conditions Favorable to Domestic Realization
of ESC Rights
a. The Duty of International Cooperation Among States
The right to development also includes, but is not identical with, the
"duty of international cooperation" among states. 94 This duty is an
important element of the right that contributes to its normative force.
90.
91.
92.

Schrijver, Permanent Sovereignty, supra note 77, at 90.
Id.
Subrata Roy Chowdhury, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources:

Substratum of the Seoul Declaration,in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note

77, at 59, 80.
93. An analogy may be made here with the application of the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of a state. In the exercise of its sovereignty, a country may
invite another country to intervene in the former's internal affairs without derogating that
sovereignty. See, e.g., ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NoRMS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 53 (2006).

94. See, e.g., Daniel O'Donnell, The Right to Development, Human Rights and the New
International Economic Order, ILANUD, Afto 5, No. 15 y Aflo 6, No. 16, available at
www.ilanud.or.cr/A052.pdf.
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(1) Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter
There exists a norm in international law that directs states "to
cooperate" with one another in order to achieve certain desired
outcomes set forth in the U.N. Charter.95 This duty of international
cooperation is not merely deduced or implied from some general or
abstract duties of states (for example, the duty of friendly relations). It is
a concrete duty whose mandatory character is supported by treaty lawthat is, Article 56 of the U.N. Charter, in reference to Article 55
thereof-which provides that
Article 56. All Members pledge themselves to take joint and
separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.
Article 55. With a view to the creation of conditions of stability
and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United
Nations shall promote:
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of
economic and social progress and development;
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related
problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation;
and
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion. 96
One of the arguments for the legal basis of the right to development
is the duty of international cooperation among states on the strength of
the above-quoted provisions. 97 Khurshid Iqbal, for example, argues that
"the main principle" that gives legal force to the right to development is
the well-established duty to cooperate. 9 8 Rich also argues that the dut
to cooperate is "the fundamental source of the right to development."
95.
96.

Id.
U.N. Charter arts. 55, 56.

97.

HENRY J. STEINER ET AL.,

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW,

PoLITIcs, MORALS 1442 (3d ed. 2008).
98. Iqbal, supra note 4, at 1.
99. Rich, An EmergingHuman Right, supra note 37, at 291.
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The U.N. Independent Expert on the Right to Development, Arjun
Sengupta, also shares the view that "the case of international
cooperation could be further strengthened by referring ... to Article 55
and 56 of the Charter." 00 He adds that owing to the "special status" of
the U.N. Charter as the foundation of the present-day international
system, states must commit to heart and seriously fulfill their duty of
international cooperation.' 0 '
However, the duty of international cooperation has its share of
skeptics, who are of the view that the duty to cooperate as formulated in
Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter "remains rather abstract and
permits a relatively wide margin of discretion regarding its practical
interpretation and application." 02 It is submitted that this criticism is
misguided, rather overly harsh, in its insistence for "specifics" in a
constitutional document that the U.N. Charter is. Edward Kwakwa
responds to the same criticism by arguing that
Article 56 of the Charter clearly obligates a state to do something
towards the achievement of the purposes [of the United Nations]
set forth in article 55. This implies a right to do nothing does not
exist. . . . [W]hile the provisions are general, nevertheless they

have the force of positive international law and create basic
duties. Political and juridical organs of the UN have also
interpreted the provisions of articles 55 and 56 as constituting
legal obligations. The preferable view, therefore, is that these
Charter provisions establish firm commitments in the form of a
binding treaty obligation.' 0 3
First, it is clear who bears the duty to cooperate-all members of the
United Nations.104 Second, it is also clear what conduct is required of
the members-to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the
Actual
United Nations for the solution of international problems.'
examples of "joint and separate action" contemplated by the U.N.
Charter are scientific and technological cooperation, transfer of

100. Arijun Sengupta, The Right to Development as a Human Right, 4 (2000) (working
paper on file with the Harvard University Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and
Human Rights).
101. Id.
102. Danilo Turk, ParticipationofDeveloping Countries in Decision-makingProcesses,in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, supranote 77, at 342.

103. Edward Kwakwa, Emerging International Development Law and Traditional
InternationalLaw-Congruenceor Cleavage?, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 431, 442 (1987).
104. U.N. Charter art. 56.
105. U.N. Charter art. 55.
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technology, as well as cultural and educational cooperation.106 Because
the types of cooperation are as numerous as the number of international
problems they are meant to solve, it is unrealistic to enumerate them all
in the U.N. Charter. But that does not mean that the duty to cooperate is
abstract and vague. Lastly, it is clear to what purpose cooperation
among states is aimed for-the achievement of the three objectives
enumerated in Article 55 of the U.N. Charter. 0 7
Moreover, when one considers certain resolutions adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly that reiterate the duty to cooperate and "provide
a considerable degree of guidance as to its specifics,"1os the
superficiality of the above criticism is immediately exposed. The more
prominent of these resolutions are the 1970 Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States,109 the 1974 Declaration and Programme of Action on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 1' 0 the 1975
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,"' and the 1986
Declaration on the Right to Development.112 While admittedly these
resolutions are not per se "sources" of international law, they are meant
to interpret general provisions of the U.N. Charter (among which is the
duty to cooperate) and must therefore be regarded as authoritative
elucidations by the General Assembly on those general provisions.
Among these resolutions, it is the Charter on the Economic Rights and
Duties of States, Article 17 that most clearly explains the duty to
cooperate as follows:
International co-operation for development in the shared goal and
common duty of all States. Every State should co-operate with
the efforts of developing countries to accelerate their economic
106. Art. 56, Repertory, Supp. 3, vol. 11 (1959-1966), available at http://untreaty.un.org/
cod/repertory/art56/english/repsupp3_vol2-art56_e.pdf; see, e.g., Declaration on the Occasion
of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations 3, available at http://www.un.org/UN50/dec.
htm.
107. U.N. Charter art. 55.
108. Stephen P. Marks, Obligations to Implement the Right to Development:
Philosophical,Political, and Legal Rationales, in DEVELOPMENT AS A HUMAN RIGHT 57, 74

(Bard A. Andreassen & Stephen Marks eds., 2006).
109. See generally Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
1883d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/85 (Oct. 24, 1970).
110. See generally Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., U.N. Doc. A/7 (May
1, 1974).
111. See generally Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281
(XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2315th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/48 (Dec. 12, 1974).
112. See generally Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, 41st Sess.,
97th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol22/iss2/6

24

Villaroman: The Right to Development: Exploring the Legal Basis of a Supernor

2010]

THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: EXPLORING THE LEGAL BASIS OFA SUPERNORM

323

and social development by providing favourable external
conditions and by extending active assistance to them, consistent
with their development needs and objectives, with strict respect
for the sovereign equality of States and free of any conditions
derogating from their sovereignty." 3
(2) Articles 2(1) and 11 of the ICESCR
Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn argue that certain provisions of the
ICESCR are susceptible to an interpretation that developed states have
an obligation "to provide assistance to poorer states parties in situations
in which the latter are prevented by a lack of resources from fulfilling
their obligations under the Covenant."ll 4 First among these is the clause
"to take steps, individually and through internationalassistanceand cooperation, especially economic and technical" found in Article 2(1) of
the ICESCR. " The full import of this clause leads some commentators
to argue that, even standing alone, it provides the legal basis for the
right to development. The second provision is Article I1(1) which
mandates states parties to fulfill the "right ... to an adequate standard of
living" of their people while recognizing "the essential importance of
international co-operation based on free consent" to achieve this goal." 6
The third provision is Article 11(2) which, although concerning the
specific "right ... to be free from hunger," directs states parties to take
steps "individually and through international co-operation" to achieve
this right.
Stephen Marks assigns a heavy significance on the duty "to take
steps, individually and through international assistance and
cooperation" found in Article 2(1) as providing "a legal basis for the
reciprocal obligations between and among states parties to the
ICESCR." 7 According to his view, this duty provides the ICESCR a
sort of "horizontal" dimension, meaning the existence of an obligation
among the states parties inter se, as opposed to a "vertical" dimension
that involves obligations owed by a state party to its own population.'
He argues that the full realization of ICESCR rights cannot be attained
in a piecemeal fashion,
113. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., 1325th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/48 (Dec. 12, 1974).
114. Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations
Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HuM. RTs. Q.
156, 186 (1987).
115. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), art. 2(1), U.N. GAOR (Dec. 16, 1966) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ICESC].
116. Id.art.11(l).
117. Marks, supranote 108, at 72 (emphasis added).
118. Id.
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but only through a policy that is deliberately designed to achieve
all the rights, progressively and in accordance with available
resources .... These are the legal obligations of each of the states
parties . . . not only to alter its internal policy but also to act

through international cooperation toward the same end.119
However, the duty of international cooperation may be given a
restrictive interpretation which, if proven to be valid, weakens the legal
force of the right to development. According to this interpretation, the
obligation of developed states extends only as far as participating in
international agencies concerned with development issues such as, for
example, the U.N. Development Program or the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development.120 In other words, developed
states fully comply with the duty to cooperate even when they engage
only in nominal participation or involvement in these agencies. The
flaw in this restrictive interpretation can easily be ex Posed when the
intent of the framers of ICESCR is taken into account.
This intent is
also expressed in the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development
when it provides that the duty requires "effective" international

cooperation-which means one that produces concrete results and not
just perfunctory or general involvement in the activities of international
agencies.122 Criticizing this restrictive interpretation, Stephen Marks
stated that it ignores "the politically significant pronouncements of
high-level conferences and legally significant interpretations of expert
bodies" 23 all of which "provide a considerable degree of guidance as to
the specifics of the general legal obligation of international
cooperation."' 2 4
b. The Duty of Preferential Treatment of Developing Countries
Before a group is said to enjoy preferential treatment compared to
other groups, it is first necessary to identify that "group" as distinct or
unique from the rest. Have developing countries become distinct or
unique subjects of international law? Rich believes so as evidenced by
the fact that "developing countries" have been regarded as a separate
group in various international instruments adopted over many decades,
ranging from human rights treaties to the U.N. Convention on the Law
119. Id.
120. Id. at 72-73.
121. Id. pmbl.
122. The Macquarie Dictionary defines the word "effective" as "producing the intended or
expected result." The Macquarie Dictionary Online, http://www.macquariedictionary.com.au.
123. Marks, supra note 108, at 73.
124. Id. at 74.
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of the Sea.12 5 He argues that some treaties "show an awareness of
developing countries as a special, protected category of States." 26
Isabella Bunn agrees that "developing countries are, in some respects,
treated as special subjects of international law" as evidenced by various
resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly dealing with them as
a distinct grouping of states.127
But have developing countries been treated "preferentially"? Again,
both authors believe so because developing countries "are beneficiaries
as such of special rights in international law" not conferred to other
subjects of international law.128 Isabella Bunn argues that the
phenomenon of preferential treatment of developing countries "is
grounded in a duty to cooperate for development, and has emerged over
several decades of state practice." 29 Evidence of state practice in this
regard can be found in different areas of international law, among which
are: in some human rights treaties;130 in agreements that give trade
concessions; 131 in the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention
giving certain benefits to developing countries;' 32 and in the practice of
providing development assistance. 1 3 Although with respect to the last
one, most developed states still consider it as a matter of discretion and
benevolence rather than as a matter of legal obligation. Other areas
where preference is accorded to developing countries include
international agreements relating to investment, natural resources,
relocation of industry, the oceans, intcrnational liquidity, and other

related areas.134
Oscar Schachter analyzes the common rationale that underlies the
preferential treatment of developing countries in these areas and finds
that it is "the idea of need as a basis for entitlement."l 35 What he found
125.

Rich, A Right ofPeoples, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supra note 26, at 48.

126.
127.

Rich, An EmergingHuman Right, supra note 37, at 302.
Bunn, supranote 34, at 1448.

128.

Rich, A Right ofPeoples, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supranote 26 (emphasis added).

129. Bunn, supra note 34, at 1448.
130. The ICESCR, for example, recognizes the special circumstance of developing
countries and takes into account their "available resources" in gauging compliance with the
treaty. ICESC, supra note 115.
131. See, e.g., Bernard Hoekman et al., Special and Differential Treatment of Developing
Countries in the WTO: Moving Forward After Canctin, in TRADE PREFERENCES AND
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ch. 29 (Bernard Hoekman ed., 2006).

132. The UNCLOS contain provisions that give preferences to developing countries in the
areas of inter alia access to fishing zones (Article 62) and access to seabed mining technology
(Annex III, article 5.3.e). U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
conventionagreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
133. See SIGRUN SKOGLY, BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS:
OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 83-98 (2006).

134.
135.

STATES'

HUMAN

RIGHTS

Schachter, supra note 24, at 9.
Id. at 10.
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remarkable about this idea is not its espousal by its beneficiaries (i.e.,
developing countries) which is to be expected but rather its general
acceptance by the developed countries against whom the idea will be
invoked against. Schachter argues that the "scale and duration" of the
practice of giving preferential treatment to developing countries "have
been substantial enough to demonstrate the practical acceptance of a
responsibility [on the part of developed states] based on the entitlement
of those in need." 36 In other words, the practice of giving preferential
treatment to developing countries has crystallized into a customary
norm of international law. However, Schachter is quick to point out that
the idea of need as a basis for entitlement is different from the Marxist
ideal of "to each according to his needs, from each according to his
ability"; rather the idea is confined with the "provi[sion] for the minimal
human needs of the most disadvantaged segments of society." 37
Emphasizing what the norm of preferential treatment of developing
countries adds to present-day international law, Milan Bulajic argues
that
The problems of development cannot be resolved on the basis of
the principles of peaceful co-existence among States with
different political and economic systems. Coexistence as a
minimum standard for preserving world peace, should be further
developed and it should be the duty of all States to cooperate for
development, on the basis of pre erential and non-reciprocal
treatment of developing countries.
c. The Duty of Preventing Damage or Harm Against the
Rights of Another
The last norm that supports the existence of the right to development
is the principle that a person, in the exercise of his or her right, must not
cause damage or harm to the rights of another. This is the principle of
abuse of rights. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.' This principle
can be found in "the majority of the legal systems of the world." 40 It is
a widely held principle that certainly qualifies as a "general principle of
law among civilised nations"--another sanctified "source" of

136. Id.
137. Id,
138. BULAIC, supra note 52, at 50 (emphasis added).
139. "One should use his own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another."
BLACK'S LAW DIcnoNARY 1380 (Centennial ed. 1991).
140. Enrique Gomez-Pinzon, State Responsibilityfor External Consequences of Domestic
Economic-RelatedActs, 16 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 52, 79 (1986).
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international law according to Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute. 14 ' This
principle has been applied by the court in Trail Smelter (United States v.
Canada) where it ruled that
Under the principles of international law . . . no State has the

right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as
to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence. 142
Almost two decades later, the same principle was reiterated by the
arbitral tribunal in Lake Lanoux (France v. Spain). The tribunal applied
the principle of abuse of rights when it stated that the upstream state
(France), in the exercise of its lawful activities involving the lake within
its territory, is obliged to consider the interests of the downstream state
(Spain) and to strive to "give them all satisfactions compatible with the
pursuit of its [France] own interests."l4 3
David Beetham opines that "it would be difficult to contest the
principle that the first duty of governments, as of citizens also, is not to
cause damage or harm" to the rights of another. 1" This translates into a
practical rule of conduct in the international system, according to him,
that states have the duty "not to initiate or support policies or
institutional arrangements, whether domestic or international which
systematically damage any country's economic development."'f5 James
Crawford considers this as the negative duty of every state not to
impede the development of another state.146
Enrique Gomez-Pinzon explains that the criteria used in determining
whether there has been an abuse of rights differ from one national
141. Oscar Schachter classifies five groups of general principles of international law that
have been applied in international cases: (1) principles of municipal law "recognized by
civilized nations"; (2) general principles of law "derived from the specific nature of the
international community"; (3) principles "intrinsic to the idea of law and basic to all legal
systems"; (4) principles "valid through all kinds of societies in relationships of hierarchy and coordination"; and (5) principles of justice founded on "the very nature of man as a rational and
social being." See, e.g., Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International
Courts and Tribunals (London, Stevens 1953); Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to
General Principles of Law, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 786 (1989-1990); OSCAR SCHACHTER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 50-55 (1991).

142. Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941).
143. Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), Arbitral Tribunal Nov. 16, 1957, 24 INT'L
L. REPS. 101, 139 (1957).
144. Beetham, supra note 2, at 84.
145. Id.
146. Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: Peoples or Governments?, in THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES, supra note 26, at 66.
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jurisdiction to another.147 Two of these criteria are relevant to the acts or
omissions of states on the international plane: the "harmful alternative"
criterion and the "flagrant disproportion between damage and profit"
test.148 According to the "harmful alternative" rule, "[w]henever a State
can obtain, through alternative means, the goals it is pursuing, it must
choose the one which would avoid causing injuries to other States." 49 if
State A choses a course of action that is harmful to State B, when State
A could have chosen an alternative that is harmless to State B, then
State A has abused its rights. On the other hand, according to the
"flagrant disproportion between damage and profit" test, "if the exercise
of a right tends to satisfy an interest of minimal importance in
comparison to the harm caused [to others], then the right has been
abused." 50 Stated differently, if the exercise of a right will both result
in a minimal advantage to its holder and a great disadvantage to another,
then the holder of such right is not justified in exercising it.
Two scenarios are possible here: intentional and unintentional
damage or harm to a developing state. With respect to the first, the
aforesaid duty clearly applies as it is precisely meant to prohibit a state
from damaging or harming another through ill-will, malice or dolo. For
example, when a coastal state knowingly and unjustifiably prohibits the
transport of international food aid on its territory en route to the starving
population of a landlocked state, then the former causes damage or
harm to the latter through dolo. The latter's population is denied their
right to food. Meanwhile, the proscription equally applies when the
damage or harm is done to a state as a result of negligence, lack of
foresight or skill, or other species of culpa on the part of the guilty state.
For example, when an importer state suddenly halts the importation of
an agricultural product from an exporter state whose population relies
on it as their only source of livelihood, then the former causes damage
or harm to the latter through culpa. The latter's population is denied
their right to work. In other words, the duty not to cause damage or
harm is still breached even though the guilty state's action is ostensibly
within its prerogative (i.e., the importer state can choose to get the
product from another exporter state) and short of malice or ill-will but
nonetheless failed to take into consideration the human rights violation
in the other state. In this example, the importer state's lack of foresight
as to the dire effects of its action upon the population of the exporter
state led to the breach of the duty. Therefore, a guilty state incurs state
responsibility if it causes damage or harm to another state as a result of

147.
148.
149.
150.

Gomez-Pinzon, supra note 140, at 80.
Idat 81.
Id.
Id.
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either a malicious conduct or an unintentional act but with reckless
disregard to the wellbeing of other peoples.
However, it may be argued that the developed states, in pursuing
their legitimate national interests, in fact usually cause "incidental
damage" (i.e., non-intentional) to developing countries, and such
contrary state practice therefore proves that the duty of preventing
damage or harm (as a result of culpa, at least) is non-existent in
international law. The argument is specious because, as Rosalyn
Higgins commented, the widespread examples of non-compliance of a
norm do not negate its existence in international law. 15' Adam McBeth
similarly argues that "[a]n obligation that is not effectively enforced ...
is not necessarily stripped of its legal character as an obligation."1 52 For
example, even if most states actually engage in the practice of torturing
political dissidents, that in itself does not mean that the obligation
prohibiting torture is non-existent or has ceased to exist.
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States includes a
strong normative language that lends support to the duty of states "not
to cause damage or do harm" to the lawful interests of other states,
particularly in the economic realm. Although already a general principle
of law, this negative duty finds expression in the following provision of
the Charter:
All States have the duty to conduct their mutual economic
relations in a manner which takes into account the interest of
other countries. In particular, all States should avoid prejudicing
the interests of developing countries.' 53
This duty "not to cause damage or do harm" is required of states not
only in their bilateral or multilateral dealings with each other but also in
their actions or activities within the international organizations they
belong to. The Maastricht Guidelines, another interpretative document,
provides that "[i]t is particularly important for States to use their
influence to ensure that violations do not result from the programmes
and policies of the organizations of which they are members." 4 Thus,
151. ROSALYN HIGGINS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT: PROBLEMS AND
PROCEsS 20 (1998).

152. Adam McBeth, Every Organ of Society: The Responsibility of Non-state Actors for
the Realization ofHuman Rights 30 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 33, 66 (2008).
153. Charter of Economic Right and Duties of States, GA Res. 3281 (XXIX) of 12 Dec.
1974, art. 24 (emphasis added).
154. Guideline 19, Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Maastricht, Jan. 22-26, 1997. The guidelines were formulated by a group of more than
thirty experts who met in Maastricht, The Netherlands in January 1997. The objective of the
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for example, if an international organization implements a program or
policy that damages or does harm to a particular state, responsibility
therefore is attributable not only to the organization itself but also to its
Member States that voted in favor of such program or policy.
What then is the relationship of the "duty not to cause damage or
harm" to the right to development? David Beetham argues that, if states
initiate or maintain an international arrangement or policy in breach of
their obligation "not to cause damage or do harm" to another state, then
the latter's right to development is violated. Mohammed Bedjaoui
proposes that "the best means of ensuring the citizens right to
development would be to liberate the State from certain international
arrangements which unjustly siphon off its wealth abroad." 55 Similarly,
Andreassen and Marks argue that, by virtue of the right to development,
developed countries- "acting through their development cooperation
programs or through the international institutions to which they
belong-have a duty ofj relaxing constraints on productive resources'
of developing states." 6 Pursued to their logical conclusion, these views
call for the modification or even the complete abrogation of those
features of the international system (whether it be political, economic or
financial) that damage or harm the development of poor countries,
including their capacity to progressively realize the rights of their
people.
But what if modifying or abrogating those features of the
international system would lead to damage or harm to the nationals of
developed states? When are developed states duty-bound to prioritize
the nationals of other states over their own nationals or interest?
Although discussing the "morality" of giving international aid, Thomas
Pogge was confronted with the same questions and postulated that states
have a "hierarchy of obligations" which includes the "negative duties
not to wrong (unduly harm) others" occupying the top spot. 5 7
According to him, when it comes to the positive duties to give aid or
assistance, it is perfectly legitimate if states will prioritize their own
nationals or interests. But when it comes to the negative duty not to
cause damage or harm, the priority accorded to a state's nationals or its
interest becomes arbitrary. The conclusion, Pogge argues, is that a
state's duty not to cause damage or do harm must always prevail over
positive duties to assist or protect that state's own nationals or
group was to expound on the Limburg Principles as regards the nature and scope of violations of
rights in the ICESCR and to adopt appropriate responses and remedies.
155. Bedjaoui, supra note 1, at 1180-81.
156.

Bard A. Andreassen & Stephen Marks, Conclusion, in DEVELOPMENT AS A HUMAN

RIGHT 308 (Bard A. Andreassen & Stephen Marks eds., 2006).
157. THOMAs W. POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 132-33 (1999); also cited
in Beetham, supra note 2, at 91.
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interest. 58 In the ultimate analysis, it is in the interest of developed
states to assist the people of developing countries (either through a
positive duty to give aid or through a negative duty not to harm, or
both). Lester Pearson explains the reason why this is so:
If the rich countries ... concentrate on the elimination of poverty
and backwardness at home and ignore them abroad, what would
happen to the principles by which they seek to live? Could the
moral and social foundations of their own societies remain firm
and steady if they washed their hands of the plight of others?l 59
IV. CONCLUSION

The right to development is a legal right guaranteed to peoples (and
not to individual persons) and is demandable against the international
community. It is a composite of fundamental norms that rest on a firm
foundation under positive international law. For quite some time, it has
been, and it still is, part of de lege lata. But the tendency of its
proponents to expand its reach, in their eager desire to solve all the
problems of this world, makes it prone to the accusation that it is still a
"soft law" or part of de lege ferenda. Having demonstrated the legal
basis of the right to development, the next question is-what does it
entail to developing states? How will they benefit from the right in
concrete terms? This Article has answered these questions by showing
the correlative duties of developed states or international organizations:
first, there is an obligation to respect and observe a developing state's
freedom to manage its own economy in general and its right to an
independent economic planning in particular; and second, there is an
obligation to modify or remove those features of the international
system that cause damage or harm to developing countries.
But what if a state violates any or all of the norms comprising the
right to development? What is the consequence of this violation? This is
where the law of state responsibility may be especially invoked by the
aggrieved state. It provides "that a State could be held responsible b
other subjects of international law for any injuries it caused to them."' 0
The International Law Commission's 2001 U.N. Articles on the
15 8.

Id.

159. LESTER PEARSON, PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENT: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 7 (1969).

160. August Reinisch, Debt Restructuring and State Responsibility Issues, in LA DETTE
EXTERIEURE 557 (Dominique Carreau & Malcolm N. Shaw eds., 1995).
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Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of States
provides that "[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State entails the
international responsibility of that State."' 6 ' An "internationally
wrongful act" is defined as an act or omission "constitut[ing] a breach
of an international obligation of the State"' 62 regardless of the origin or
character of that obligation whether customary, conventional or other.16 3
However, actual remedial measures to address breaches of the right to
development are outside the scope of this Article whose only objective
is confined to proving the legal basis of such a right.
The criticism that the right to development merely combines existing
individual human rights and does not add anything new to human rights
law is occasioned by a lack of understanding about the true meaning
and import of the right. It does not really involve any serious challenge
against the right's normative strength. The right to development, as
shown in this Article, is a people's right that is distinct and separate
from individual human rights. By virtue of the right, entitlements and
duties on the part of a people (as the "rights-holder") and states or their
organizations in the international system (as the "duty-bearers"),
respectively, are created ipso facto. Having demonstrated the composite
nature of the right to development, comprising as it does of several
legally binding norms, this Article is a direct refutation of the charge of
non-justiciability. It is shown that the core essentials that make up the
right to development are firmly anchored on positive international law
and, therefore, violation of any or all of them results in state
responsibility on the part of the violator state. Having said that, there is
no reason why a violation of the right to development, like any other
internationally wrongful act, cannot lend itself to remedial actions in
order to seek redress for the damage or harm done to an aggrieved state
or its people.

161.
States for
162.
163.

International Law Commission (ILC), 2001 U.N. Articles on the Responsibility of
Internationally Wrongful Acts of States, art. 1.
Id. art. 2(b).
Id. art. 12.
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